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I. INTRODUCTION

On the night of March 10, 2010, Brooke Melton
was driving her 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt northbound on
Georgia Highway 9, 30 miles outside of Atlanta.' Melton,
a pediatric nurse, was heading to her boyfriend's residence to celebrate her 29th birthday. 2 Without warning,
the Cobalt fishtailed, skidding across the wet pavement, over the centerline, and into oncoming traffic.' A
car driving in the southbound lane slammed into the
passenger side of Melton's car, sending it spinning off
the highway and down a 15-foot hill into a creek.' Melton was rushed to a nearby hospital, where she succumbed to a fatal brain injury.'
Melton's death was just one of more than 32,000
that occur as the result of motor vehicle accidents every
1 Complaint at 4-5, Melton v. General Motors LLC, No. 1:14-cv-

01815, 2014 WL 3565682 (N.D. Ga. 2014); Adam L. Penenberg, GM's
Hit and Run: How a Lawyer, Mechanic, and Engineer Blew Open the
Worst Auto Scandal in History, PANDODAILY (Oct. 18, 2014),

http://pando.com/2014/10/18/gms-hit-and-run-how-a-lawyermechanic-and-engineer-blew-the-lid-off-the-worst-auto-scandalin-history/.
2 Penenberg, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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year.' Such accidents are the leading cause of death for
Americans in Melton's 5-34 age bracket.' In one way,
however, Melton's death was more than just another
statistic. Melton's parents filed a wrongful death suit
against the maker of Brooke's car, General Motors. That
suit uncovered an ignition switch defect present in millions of automobiles, and sparked one of the largest automotive recalls ever.8
Is that story, of a private lawsuit initiating an automotive recall, unique? Or, like Brooke Melton's death,
is it a fundamental part of a society that revolves
around the automobile? These questions are important
because they explore both the value of private litigation
as well as the effectiveness of federal automotive safety
regulations. The purpose of this paper is to shed new,
empirically grounded light on these questions.
In Section I, I provide a brief history of the American automotive recall process, beginning with the creation of the federal agency responsible for handling
such recalls, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). I also detail the contemporary
automotive recall process, examining the administrative apparatus within NHTSA that investigates and orders recalls. In Section II, I describe the traditional view
of private litigation's role in the automotive recall process, which sees private litigation's only role in the initiation of automotive recalls as creating the specter of
post hoc liability for defect-related injuries. In Section
III, I test this view by generating a dataset containing
automotive recalls issued in 2014. I then code each recall for the presence of defect-related litigation filed before the recall was initiated. In Section IV, I present the
aggregate data from the dataset alongside narratives of
each recall that coded positively for pre-recall litigation. I find that the majority of vehicles recalled were
6

Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,

TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS

2013,
U.S.
Dep't
of
Transp.,
http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812139.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA].
' Leading Causes of Death Reports, National and Regional,
1999-2014, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,

http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/leadcaus1Ous.html
updated June 24, 2015).
8 See infra at Section IV, Part B, Subpart 1.
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preceded by defect-related litigation. In Section V, I discuss how the data suggests an alternative view of private litigation's role in the automotive recall process,
one that asserts the existence of a more direct, investigatory role for private litigators in initiating recalls. I
also suggest some normative implications of the alternative view for tort reform legislation, federal auto
safety regulations, products liability law, and the use of
suppression orders by courts. I conclude with commentary on further avenues for research and how this paper
fits into the broader literature regarding the value of
work done by plaintiffs' lawyers.
II.

THE AUTOMOTIVE RECALL PROCESS

The concept of the automotive recall arose in the
United States in 1966 as a result of the passage of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (the Safety
Act), the bedrock of the auto safety regulatory regime. 9
The Safety Act was a "dramatic attempt at legal transformation," a shift from regulating people to regulating
their environment; that is, regulating motor vehicles instead of motorists."o The Safety Act created NHTSA to
enforce its provisions." At its genesis, NHTSA's focus
was on the development of mandatory minimum safety
requirements for automobiles. 2 It achieved that goal
with celerity, issuing 43 safety standards in its first six
years of existence."
By 1974, however, this rulemaking deluge had
slowed to a drip in the wake of Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation,which banned rules that failed
I

National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 [hereinafter Safety Act].
W0 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY (1990) [hereinafter MASHAW & HARFST, STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY]; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987) [hereinafter Mashaw, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehi-

cle Safety].
" See Safety Act, supra note 9, Sec. 115.
12

MASHAW

13

Id.

69.

& HARFST, STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY, supra note 10, at
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to have adequately "objective" performance criteria. 14
Subsequent hearings on NHTSA's effectiveness led to
the Safety Act being amended to set the agency on a
new path, empowering it to combat automobile defects
using new subpoena powers, the ability to inspect manufacturing facilities, and expanded abilities to push automakers to recall defective vehicles." The 1974
amendments changed NHTSA from a "proactive, technology forcing regulatory agency" to a "complaints bureau and prosecutor's office."'6
Automotive recalls continue to be a critical part
of NHTSA's operations. A top NHTSA official said in
2014 the agency's recall powers were "its greatest
strength."" That sentiment has been reflected in the
growing number of recalls that involve agency investigations every year. Between 1966 and 1972, there were
195 recalls. 8 That number has risen in almost every
subsequent seven-year period, reaching 1,201 recalls
between 2008 and 2014.19 NHTSA describes every recall
initiated as either being "influenced" or "not influenced" by the agency. Any recall that is preceded by a
NHTSA investigation is deemed to be "influenced,"
while any recall that is initiated independently by a
manufacturer is classified as "not influenced." 20 Historically, NHTSA has influenced less than a quarter of all
recalls." However, NHTSA has had a larger influence on
recalls as calculated by total recalled vehicle volume.
Of the vehicles that were recalled between 1966 and
2014, more than half were influenced by NHTSA. 22
14 Id. at 71 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 515 F.2d
1053 (6th Cir. 1975)).
" Id. at 110.
16

Id. at 111.

" The GM Ignition Switch Recall: Why Did It Take So Long?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy And Commerce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement
of David Friedman, Acting Admin. NHTSA) available as a download
from www.nhtsa.gov.
" NHTSA, Office of Defects Invest., Recalls Database (Mar. 15,
2015), http://www.nhtsa.gov/Data/DataMod/DataMod.
19 Id.
20
21
22

Friedman, supra note 17, at 7.
See NHTSA, supra note 18.
See infra Appendix I: Figure 1, Figure 2.
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Defect investigation is managed by two offices in
NHTSA. One is the Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance,
which tests new vehicles to determine if they meet Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. 23 The other is the
Office of Defects Investigations (ODI), whose 50 staff
members initiate the majority of recalls for NHTSA. 24
ODI spends much of its time searching for potential defects by trawling through two sources. The first is data
from manufacturers' "early warning reporting" (EWR)
systems, mandated by the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability,
and
Documentation
(TREAD) Act of 2000.25 These data include "property
damage claims, consumer complaints, warranty claims,
and field reports from incidents involving certain vehicle components and conditions defined in NHTSA regulations." 26 The second source ODI looks to for information on potential safety defects is the 40 to 50
thousand consumer complaints it receives annually.
When a possible safety defect is detected, ODI
opens an investigation called a "preliminary evaluation" and notifies the manufacturer as well as the public.

28

ODI opens between 80 and 100 of these prelimi-

nary evaluations on an annual basis." If a preliminary
evaluation discovers a defect trend, the investigation is
elevated to an "engineering analysis," where ODI uses
"inspections, surveys, tests, and efforts to obtain additional information from the manufacturer" to analyze
the potential defect. 0 If the engineering analysis generates further evidence of a defect, NHTSA convenes an
23

Friedman, supra note 17, at 4.

24

Id.

Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (TREAD) Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2000).
26 NHTSA,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, NO. ST-2015-063,
2'

INADEQUATE DATA AND ANALYSIS UNDERMINE NHTSA's EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY
AND INVESTIGATE VEHICLE SAFETY CONCERNS, 4 (2015) (citing 49 C.F.R.

Part 579).
27 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT. OFFICE, GAO-01-225, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY:
NHTSA's ABILITY TO DETECT AND RECALL DEFECTIVE REPLACEMENT CRASH
PARTS IS LIMITED, 8 (2001).
28
29

3o

Id.
Id.

Id.
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investigation review panel." If the panel determines
that a defect is present, NHTSA sends a formal recall
request letter to the manufacturer.3 2 In virtually every
case, the manufacturer complies with the request.
Most investigations never reach the panel stage because
manufacturers will initiate a recall themselves earlier in
the process.3 4 Recalls are formally initiated when a manufacturer files a Defect and Noncompliance Report (informally known as a "573 report") with NHTSA. 3" A 573
report lists information on the kind and number of vehicles affected, the estimated percentage of vehicles recalled that have the defect, the description of the defect, and a description of the proposed remedy."
III. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF PRIVATE LITIGATION'S ROLE IN
THE AUTOMOTIVE RECALL PROCESS

The traditional view of how private litigation3 7
3

Id. at 9.

32

Id.

Ryan Beene, When Recalls go to Court, NHTSA Tends to Win,
AUTO.
NEWS,
(Dec.
22,
2014,12:01AM),
http://www.autonews.com/article/20141222/OEM1 1/312229981/when-recallsgo-to-court-nhtsa-tends-to-win.
34 See, e.g., CHRYSLER, 573 REPORT FOR RECALL, 14V-373 (June 25,
http://wwwat
2016),
available
33

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/download/doc/UCM45 7640/RCDNN-14V373-3445P.pdf.
See 49 C.F.R § 573.6 (2014).
Id.
37 This view can be gleaned from a review of scholarly literature as well as statements of key players in government and industry. See, e.g., Nicholas G. Rupp & Curtis R. Taylor, Who Initiates
Recalls and Who Cares?Evidence from the Automobile Industry, 50
J. OF INDUST. ECON., 123 (2002) (finding that the government initiates
larger & less hazardous recalls, while inexpensive & more hazardous recalls are initiated by manufacturers); Nicholas G. Rupp, The
Attributes of a Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automotive Industry, 25 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. INQUIRY 2 1-44, 23 (2004); John D. Graham,
35

36

ProductLiability and Motor Vehicle Safety, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE
IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 120 (Peter W. Huber

& Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); Kamrul Ahsan, Trend Analysis of Car
Recalls: Evidence from The U.S. Market, 4 INT'L. J. OF MANAGING VALUE
& SUPPLY CHAINS 1 (2013).
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plays a role in the automotive recall process sees automakers as akin to drivers on a highway in that both
groups modify their behavior to accommodate the
threat of costly sanctions."
Drivers tend to keep their speed within a certain
range to avoid getting pulled over and ticketed by the
police (and, with a more optimistic view of human nature, to avoid causing a life-threatening accident). Likewise, automakers tend to keep their manufacturing process free of defects to avoid a recall and civil liability
(and, on a more optimistic view of corporate nature, to
avoid getting customers involved in life-threatening accidents).
The traditional view sees private litigation as
playing two roles in the automotive recall process.
First, private litigation "impos[es] financial burdens on
manufacturers that sell unsafe vehicle designs," including direct costs like lawyers' fees, settlements, jury
awards, and punitive damages, as well as indirect costs
like reputational damage through the adverse publicity
of a high-profile trial." The second role private litigation plays was scripted by Justice Traynor's Greenman
v. Yuba Power Prods. opinion, the progenitor of the
modern products liability regime.40 In this role, litigation creates the specter of post hoc liability, which puts
a thumb on the "cost" side of manufacturer's cost-benefit analysis regarding a potential safety enhancement." The increased threat of liability raises the
chances that a manufacturer will produce a safer product in order to avoid a defect, injuries, and a costly recall. Of course, the specter will not force manufacturers
to use a welfare-maximizing strategy in decisions about

3
See Brad M. Barber & Masako N. Darrough, ProductReliability
and Firm Value: The Experience of American and Japanese Automakers, 1973-1992, 104 J. OF POL. EcON. 1984 (1996).
See Graham, supra note 37, at 125-26.
4
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal.
1963).
41
Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992); see infra Appendix
I: Figure 3.
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safety measures. 4 2 Automakers facing this specter have
shown a willingness to protect the bottom line by covering up internal tests that reveal defects,4 3 lying to victims and regulators about internal defect determinaor individual
to take
notes
tions,4 4
refusing
responsibility in meetings regarding safety design
choices to avoid liability," and misleading regulators
by procuring intentionally inaccurate accident data.4 6
The specter also affects cost-benefit analyses
conducted after a manufacturer has discovered a defect." The costs of recalling the vehicle include admitting that a defect existed, which is writing a check to a
host of plaintiffs who can prove a link between their
injury and the defective vehicle.4 8 The costs of not recalling the vehicle include settling suits that will inevitably result from injuries that could have been avoided
through a recall.4 9 Thus, a decision to initiate a recall
reflects a willingness to pay the costs of past defectrelated injuries in order to prevent the costs of future
defect-related injuries.
See George Priest, Economics of Civil Justice Reform Proposals, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 402-04 (2000).
4
See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Takata Saw and Hid Risk in Airbags
in 2004, Former Workers Say, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 6, 2014), available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2 014/11/0 7/business/airbag-makertakata-is-said-to-have-conducted-secret-tests.html.
44 See, e.g., Rebecca R. Ruiz & Danielle Ivory, Documents Show
General Motors Kept Silent on Fatal Crashes, N.Y. TIMES, (July 15,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/business/documents-show-general-motors-kept-silent-on-fatal-crashes.html;
Matthew L. Wald, Tread FailuresLead to Recall of 6.5 Million Firestone Tires, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/10/business/tread-failures-lead-to-recall-of6. 5-million-firestone-tires.html.
4
See, e.g., Mike Colias, "The GM nod," "The GM salute," and a
clash of cultures: Safety, cost-containment and impenetrable deci42

sion-making,

AUTOMOTIVE

NEWS,

(June

5,

2014,

4:38

pm),

http://www.autonews.com/article/20140605/OEM 11/140609883/the-gm-nod-the-gm-salute-and-

a-clash-of-cultures.
See, e.g., NHTSA, supra note 26.
David L. Ramp, The Impact of Recall Campaigns on Products
Liability, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 83, 84 (1977).
4

48

Id.

49

Id.
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The traditional view does not see litigation as able
to influence a recall other than through the specter of
liability's impact on corporate decision making. The
view identifies only two actors that can initiate a recall,
neither of which are litigators. The first is the manufacturer, who is usually alerted to the need for a recall by
consumer-notification or internal testing, and responds
by voluntarily recalling the affected product.s0 The second is the manufacturer, who either by the consumernotification process described above or through its own
internal testing and awareness system identifies a defect and initiates a recall. The third actor is NHTSA,
which can either launch an investigation or lawsuit that
initiates a recall. The traditional view asserts that
NHTSA tends to initiate larger recalls while manufacturers tend to initiate smaller recalls.51
If the traditional view is both complete and correct, then a review of historical automotive recalls
should confirm three descriptive claims entailed by the
view. First, there should be little presence of defect-related litigation before a recall is issued. The view will
not necessarily be undermined by a single showing of
such pre-recall litigation, particularly if that litigation
is associated with a recall that impacts a small number
of vehicles. Second, recalls initiated by NHTSA should
be larger than those initiated by manufacturers. Third,
recalls initiated by NHTSA should be less hazardous
than those initiated by manufacturers.
o Members of the public may directly petition NHTSA to investigate an alleged safety defect. ODI is required to review the petition, and must either conduct an investigation or publicize its justification for failing to do so in the Federal Register. See Nat'l

Highway Traffic Safety Admin., MOTOR VEHICLE DEFECTS AND SAFETY
RECALLS: WHAT EVERY VEHICLE OWNER SHOULD KNOW (2011), http://www-

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/MVDefectsandRecalls .pdf.
" Rupp & Taylor, Who InitiatesRecalls and Who Cares?Evidence
from Automobile Industry, supra note 37; Rupp, Attributes of a
Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automobile Industry, supra note
37.
52 Rupp & Taylor, Who InitiatesRecalls and Who Cares?Evidence
from Automobile Industry, supra note 37; Rupp, Attributes of a

Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automobile Industry, supra note
37.
* Rupp & Taylor, Who InitiatesRecalls and Who Cares?Evidence
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IV. METHOD

At the heart of the traditional view is the assumption that private litigation cannot initiate an automotive
recall. To challenge this assumption, I investigate the
link between automotive recalls and private litigation
empirically. I begin by creating a sample of recalls using information from the NHTSA ODI Recalls Database
("Recalls Database").5 4 I use that sample to create a new

dataset (the "Pre-Recall Litigation Dataset," or "the Dataset"), coding each recall for a number of variables, including the existence of pre-recall litigation related to a
given defect. This section describes the methodology
behind the construction of the Dataset.
A. Sample
The Pre-Recall Litigation Dataset is composed of
70 recalls issued in 2014, which cumulatively affected
a total of 46.9 million vehicles." The Dataset's recalls
represent a fraction of the 18,000 in the Recalls Database (803 of which occurred in 2014), which cumulatively affected a total of 804.6 million vehicles." The
Dataset is composed of recalls from eight manufacturers. Twenty-one recalls were from General Motors, 13
were from Chrysler, 12 were from Ford, eight were from
Toyota, six were from Honda, four were from Nissan,
three were from Hyundai, and three were from Kia. Sixteen different component categories were covered by
the recalls. Seventeen recalls covered air bags, 15 covered electrical systems, six covered power trains, five
covered seats and seat belts, five covered fuel systems,
four covered steering systems, three covered exterior
lighting, three covered service brakes, and the remaining 12 covered components ranging from engines to
from Automobile Industry, supra note 37; Rupp, Attributes of a
Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automobile Industry, supra note
37.
NHTSA, supra note 26.

See infra Appendix II: The Pre-Recall Dataset.
56

Id.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

132

Vol. 29:1

suspension systems. The size of the recalls in the Dataset varied considerably, with the smallest affecting
11,961 vehicles and the largest affecting 5,877,718 vehicles.
The Dataset was derived from the Recalls Database using three parameters to produce a sample that
was both meaningful and manageable. The first limited
the sample to recalls issued in 2014, recalls that were
the most likely to have easily discoverable data about
defect-related litigation. The second parameter limited
the Dataset to recalls issued by the eight largest automakers by market share in 2014: General Motors,
Ford, Toyota, Chrysler, Honda, Nissan, Hyundai, and
Kia." The final parameter limited the Dataset to recalls
that exceeded one percent of a manufacturer's 2014 car
and light truck unit sales." This limit "prevent[s] an
over weighting of recalls from the largest manufacturers and due to an overwhelming number of small recalls.""
These parameters may cause the Dataset to oversample for recalls affected by pre-recall litigation for a
number of reasons. If private litigators focus on defects
that lead to larger recalls, then limiting the sample to a
year that the New York Times labeled a "Record Year of
Recalls" could overestimate the presence of pre-recall
1 In 2014, General Motors had a 17.6% market share, Ford had
a 15.5% share, Chrysler/Fiat had a 12.6% share, Toyota had a 14.3%
share, Honda had a 9.1% share, Nissan had an 8.8% share, Hyundai
had a 4.4% share, and Kia had a 3.7% share. See Market Data Center:
Auto
Sales,
WALL
ST.
J.
(June
2,
2015),
http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html.
This parameter aligns the Dataset with sampling restrictions of
previous automotive recall studies, see Rupp & Taylor, Who Initiates Recalls and Who Cares? Evidence from Automobile Industry,
supra note 37.
" For General Motors, this number was 2,935,008; for Ford,
2,480,942; for Toyota, 2,373,771; for Chrysler, 2,090,639; for
Honda, 1,540,872; for Nissan, 1,386,895; for Hyundai, 725,718; for
Kia, 580,234. See Todd Lassa, New Car Sales Hit 16.4 Million in

2014,

AUTo.

MAG.

(Jan.

6,

2015)

http://www.automo-

bilemag.com/features/columns/1501-new-car-sales-hit-16-4-million-in-2014/.
" See Rupp & Taylor, Who InitiatesRecalls and Who Cares?Evidence from Automobile Industry, supra note 37 at 127.
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litigation in the recall process. 6 0 The exclusion of recalls
from smaller automakers may exacerbate this overinclusiveness. Those manufacturers' lower revenues may
provide weaker incentives for litigators to pursue
claims against them. These concerns, while notable,
may be offset by underinclusiveness stemming from
the flaws in the coding procedure described below.
B. Variables
The Pre-Recall Litigation Dataset codes each recall
for nine variables: NHTSA Recall Campaign Number,
Date of Recall, Manufacturer, Defective Component,
Units Affected, NHTSA Influence, Pre-Recall Litigation,
Risk of Injury, and Risk of Crash/Fire.The data for the
variables NHTSA Recall Campaign Number, Date of Recall, Manufacturer, Units Affected, and NHTSA Influence
were obtained, with small modification, from the Recalls Database. 6 ' Data for the Defective Component variable were also obtained from the Recalls Database, with
certain component categories modified for clarity.6 1
The Pre-RecallLitigation variable codes for the existence of any litigation initiated prior to a recall that
includes a well-specified claim related to the defect at
issue. The "well-specified" qualification is aimed at excluding numerous claims brought under state lemon

60 Christopher Jensen, A Record Year of Recalls: Nearly 64 Million Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/20 15/02/1 3/business/auto-safety-recalls-set-recordof-nearly-64-million-vehicles-in-2014.html. While the average year
has a vehicle-to-recall ratio of 43,362:1, 2014 has a ratio nearly
twice that size, at 79,577:1 - the second-largest such ratio since
1966. See NHTSA, supra note 18.
" NHTSA, Recall Search Tool, SAFERCAR.GOv, http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/owners/SearchSafetyIssues. In the Recalls Database, these variables are listed as "CAMPNO," "RCDATE,"
"MFGNAME," "POTAFF," and "INFLUENCED-BY," respectively. Unlike the Recalls Database, the Dataset does not differentiate between recalls influenced by OVSC or ODI.
62 Recall Search Tool, supra note 61. In the Recalls Database,
this variable is listed as "COMPNAME."
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laws and the warranty protection provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act.6 This may seem at odds with the purpose of this project, considering that lemon laws are
written to provide consumers with an avenue for obtaining remedies related to defective products.6 4 But
these cases, which include the broadest allegations of
defect, likely do not initiate automotive recalls." Still,
their exclusion means that the data may be underinclusive in terms of capturing recalls that have related prerecall litigation.
A recall coded positively for Risk of Injury when
NHTSA described it as pertaining to a defect that could
cause an injury.6 6 A recall coded positively for Risk of
Crash/Firewhen NHTSA described it as pertaining to a
defect that could increase the risk of a crash or fire. 7
These variables are intended, in part, to replace the
hazard rating that NHTSA assigned to every crash until
2002. 68

63 Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183-2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1982)).
64 See Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute Resolution System Design
Matters: An OrganizationalAnalysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer Lemon Law, 46 LAW & Soc. REV. 463 (2012).
6 In these suits, plaintiffs describe general faults with their
cars and assert that the vehicle was "defective or had defective
components." Combined with low statutory caps on recovery,
plaintiffs have little incentive to investigate the specific defect at
issue in their case. Id.; Carl S. Nance, Virginia's Lemon Law: The
Best Treatment For Car Owner's Canker, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 405
(1985).
supra note 61. This is when the
66 Recall Search Tool,
in a Recalls Database entry includes
field
"CONSEQUENCEDEFECT"
"injury."
word
any form of the

67

Recall Search Tool, supra note 61. This is when the

"CONSEQUENCEDEFECT" field in a Recalls Database entry includes
any form of the word "fire," the phrase "risk of vehicle crash," the

phrase "risk of crash," or the phrase "risk of accident."
6"

It is unclear why NHTSA decided to do away with hazard rat-

ings, which were utilized by previous researchers. See, e.g., YongKyun Bae & Hugo Benitez-Silva, Do Vehicle Recalls Reduce the Number of Accidents? The Case of the U.S. Car Market, 30 J. OF POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT.

821, 853 (2011).

2016

Private Litigation & Automotive Recalls

135

C. Procedure
Most of the variables in the Pre-Recall Dataset
were coded by extracting and manipulating data from
the Recalls Database. However, the Recalls Database included no information relevant to the Pre-Recall Litigation variable, which as a consequence was coded for using alternative sources. The first source was the 573
reports that are required to include "a chronology of all
principal events that were the basis for the determination that the defect-related to automotive safety, including a summary of all warranty claims, field or service reports, and other information, with their dates of
receipt.""9 None of the 573 reports examined mentioned
discovery, settlements, or any other information relating to pre-recall litigation.
Other sources used to code for the Pre-Recall Litigation variable include legal and news databases, including the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
System (PACER), Bloomberg Law, Nexis News, Google,
and a host of state and local court docket databases.
Each of these databases is flawed in regards to generating relevant data. PACER grants the greatest access to
court records, but fails to include a document search
function, and is limited to federal cases. Bloomberg Law
has a powerful document search function, and covers a
number of state dockets, but fails to be comprehensive.
State and local docket databases range wildly in terms
of quality and access. Even used in conjunction with
one another, these databases likely omitted instances
of pre-recall litigation, leaving the resulting Dataset underinclusive.

" Recall Search Tool, supra note 61.
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RESULTS

A. Aggregate Data
1. Data regarding recalls with pre-recall litigation
29% of the recalls in the Dataset coded positively
for the Pre-Recall Litigation variable. Those recalls covered a range of components, most of which are critical
to occupant safety: airbags, service brakes, electrical
and steering systems. Recalls coding positively for the
Pre-RecallLitigation variable affected an outsized number of vehicles. Despite representing less than 30% of
the recall sample, variable-positive recalls affected
roughly 60% of the vehicles in the sample. Variable-positive recalls also tended to be larger than non-variablepositive recalls. On average, a variable-positive recall
affected 1.46 million vehicles, more than four times the
0.37 million vehicles affected on average by a non-variable-positive recall.
Pre-recall litigation also correlates with recalls of
products with more hazardous defects. Of the vehicles
affected by recalls that coded positively for the Pre-Recall Litigation variable, 84% belonged to recalls that
coded positively for the Explicit Injury Potential variable. Just 31% of the recalls that coded negatively for the
Pre-Recall Litigation variable coded positively for the
Explicit Injury Potentialvariable. Of the vehicles in the
Dataset that coded positively for the Explicit Injury Potentialvariable, 72% belonged to recalls that coded positively for the Pre-Recall Litigation variable.
Pre-recall litigation is less likely to be involved in
recalls of products with defects that increase the risk
of crash or fire. Of the recalls that coded positively for
the Pre-Recall Litigation variable, just 35% also coded
positively for the Explicit Risk of Crash or Fire variable.
Of the recalls that coded negatively for the Pre-Recall
Litigation variable, 67% also coded positively for the Explicit Risk of Crash or Fire variable. Of the vehicles in
the Dataset that coded positively for the Explicit Risk of
Crash or Fire variable, 56% also belonged to recalls that
coded negatively for the Pre-Recall Litigation variable.
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2. Data regarding NHTSA-influenced recalls
NHTSA appears to influence larger-than-average
recalls, and, correspondingly, manufacturers appear to
initiate smaller-than-average recalls without NHTSA assistance. The recalls influenced by NHTSA affected, on
average, 1.18 million vehicles each. The recalls not influenced by NHTSA affected, on average, 0.53 million
recalls. This effect may be related to the relationship
between NHTSA investigations and pre-recall litigation.
Removing all recalls that also coded positively for the
Pre-RecallLitigation variable, the average recall volume
for an NHTSA-influenced recall drops to 0.54 million vehicles.
There is a positive relationship between NHTSA
defect investigations and the existence of pre-recall litigation. 50% of recalls that coded positively for pre-recall litigation also involved an investigation by NHTSA.
Less than 10% of recalls that did not code positively for
pre-recall litigation involved an investigation by
NHTSA. While recalls initiated by NHTSA tended to be
larger than those not initiated by NHTSA, they were
about 20% smaller on average than recalls involving
pre-recall litigation.
There is a small relationship between the NHTSAInfluenced Recalls variable and both the Explicit Injury
Potentialvariable and the Explicit Risk of Crash or Fire
variable. While over 80% of recalls that coded positively
for pre-recall litigation also coded positively for explicit
injury potential, just 53% of NHTSA-initiated recalls
shared the same attribute, which in turn was slightly
above the 45% figure for non-NHTSA-initiated recalls.
46% of all NHTSA-influenced recalls explicitly noted a
risk of crash or fire, below the 62% in the total sample
that did so.
B. Recall Narratives
The 20 recalls that coded positively for the PreRecall Litigation variable can be grouped into six distinct narratives that describe the link between a defect,
a lawsuit, and a recall.
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1. General Motors/Chrysler Ignition Switch Recalls
Four years before the crash that took Brooke Melton's life, an ODI panel was considering an internal recommendation to open an evaluation into air bag nondeployments in Chevy Cobalts and Saturn Ions.7 0 That
recommendation was based on two separate crash investigations of an incident in Wisconsin, as well as EWR
data from General Motors. 7

Years later, this infor-

mation was determined to have been enough to identify
the ignition switch defect. 7 2 Nevertheless, the panel rejected the recommendation. 7 Furthermore, NHTSA
staffers were "not asked to go out and look for new information or to reevaluate existing data." 74 In the following years, NHTSA continued to monitor the issue,
but, despite a growing body of supporting evidence and
continuing recommendations to open investigations,
failed to take action until 2014."
In February 2011, Brooke Melton's parents approached Lance Cooper, a solo practitioner from Marietta, Georgia, to defend them from a potential suit by
the driver of the car that struck their daughter's 2005

Chevrolet Cobalt.76 The Meltons were convinced that

their daughter was too cautious a driver to be the cause
of the accident, and told Cooper that Brooke's Cobalt
had been subject to a steering-related recall after her
crash.7 7 Cooper noticed service bulletins sent to dealer-

ships by General Motors in 2005 and 2006 that described how drivers could "inadvertently turn off the
ignition" in some of its cars. Convinced he had a case,
See Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong., STAFF
REPORT ON THE GM IGNITION SWITCH RECALL: REVIEW OF NHTSA 20 (2014).
71 Id. at 19.
72 Id. at 3.
7 Id. at 22.
7 Id.
7 Id. at 23-31.
76 See Penenberg, supra note 1.
" Id.
78 Patrick G. Lee & Jeff Plungis, GM Plagued as Georgia Lawyer
Presses Regulators on Deaths, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:29 AM),
70

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-17/gmplagued-as-georgia-lawyer-presses-regulators-on-deaths.
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Cooper filed a wrongful death suit against General Motors in June 2011.79

Cooper hired a forensic engineer to study
Brooke's Cobalt."o The engineer's analysis discovered
that the powertrain control module had lost power in
the seconds before the crash." The engineer suspected
that a defect in the switch was to blame, and began testing 2005 Cobalt ignition switches from scrapyards and
General Motors dealerships.1 2 The engineer confirmed

that many of the ignition switches needed an unusually
small amount of force in order to shut off - no more
than that of a knee bumping the steering column." The
engineer also noticed a discrepancy between older and
newer ignition switches, with the older switches requiring half as much torque in order to be switched off.8 4
There was no indication the new and old switches were
engineered differently - indeed, General Motors had
stamped both sets of switches with the same part number." Cooper hired a second engineer who helped confirm that ignition switches manufactured after 2008
had been quietly re-engineered to resist being easily
switched off. 6
Cooper then requested thousands of documents
through discovery, and dozens of people with
knowledge of the defect, including 12 engineers from
General Motors." Cooper elicited testimony from the
2005 Cobalt's head engineer, Raymond DeGiorgio, that
he "recognized differences between the original and replacement switches but couldn't explain why it had
been changed without GM or Delphi, the parts maker,

&

79 Order on Motion to Remand to State Court at 26, Melton v.
General Motors LLC, No. 1:14-cv-01815, 2014 WL 3565682 (N.D. Ga.
2014).
"0 Penenberg, supra note 1; Ben Klayman, Marilyn Thompson
Julia Edwards, GM's New Recall Risk - The Spare Parts Market,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-recall-aftermarket-idUSBREA2P21620140326.
1 Penenberg, supra note 1.
82

Id.

83

Id.

84
85
86

Id.
Id.
Id.

" Lee & Plungis, supra note 78.
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modifying the identification number."" Cooper got one
engineer to testify that he had experienced an ignitioncaused shutdown during a test drive in 2004."1 When
asked by Cooper if General Motors had made a "business decision not to fix this problem" before selling a
defective vehicle to Brooke Melton, the program engineering manager for the Cobalt in 2004 and 2005 testified, "That is what happened, yes."90
In September 2013, General Motors reached a settlement with the Meltons for a reported $5 million." In
February 2014, General Motors issued a recall for
619,122 model year 2005-2007 Chevrolet Cobalt and
2007 Pontiac G5 vehicles.92 One auto-safety analyst said
that Cooper "single-handedly set the stage" for the recall. In the relevant 573 report the company filed with
NHTSA, General Motors made no mention of the Meltons' lawsuit or the investigatory efforts by Cooper and
his team.9 4 Instead, the company traced the initiation of
the recall back to a meeting held in July 2011 to investigate crashes in model year 2005-2007 Cobalt and
2007 Pontiac G5 vehicles." The report does not mention
that this meeting was held one month after the Meltons
filed their initial lawsuit against the company.96
Cooper, angry at the small size of the recall, wrote
8

Penenberg, supra note 1.

89

Id.

9o Id.
9
Id.; Tom Krisher, If Reopened, Suit Versus GM Could Upend Its
Legal Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE (July 2, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/07/0 1/georgia-lawsuit-still-causing-trouble-for/ZWxKETTfSZ 1tyrJmOawRpN/story.html.
12 General Motors LLC, 573 Report for Recall 14V-047, Feb. 7,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/down2014,
load/doc/UCM450012/RCDNN-14VO47-1347P.pdf.
" Jeff Bennett, Lawyer Seeks to Reopen Suit Central to GM Recall: GM Concealed Key Facts, Suit Claims, WALL ST. J., (May 12, 2014)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579558303317864262.
9 General Motors LLC, Supplement to 573 Report for Recall 14Vhttp://www2014,
24,
Feb.
047,

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/download/doc/UCM450663/RC
DNN-14VO47-3409.pdf.
9 Id.
96

Id.
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a letter to NHTSA stating that General Motors had failed
to "include all defective vehicles in the recall."" A week
later, the company expanded the recall to include an
additional 748,024 Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Saturn vehicles.9" In March 2014, General Motors expanded the recall a third time to cover an additional 823,788 Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Saturn vehicles." General Motors
subsequently undertook an internal review of ignition
switches on all of its vehicles, which led to a spate of
further recalls through August 2014 that covered more
than 9 million vehicles."oo In total, General Motors recalled over 11.4 million vehicles in 2014 as a result of
the ignition switch.defect.
In spring 2014, ODI began an outreach campaign
to other auto manufacturers "regarding ignition key position and its effect on air bag system availability . .. in
connection with" the General Motors ignition switch recalls.101 In June 2014, following an internal investigation
at the behest of NHTSA, Chrysler issued a recall for
Letter from Lance Cooper to General Motors (Feb. 20, 2014)
(available
at
http://www.law360.com/articles/511736/attachments/0).
9"
General Motors LLC, Amended 573 Report for Recall 14V-047,
Feb.
25,
2014,
http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM450732/RC
DNN-14VO47-7510.pdf.
" General Motors LLC, Amended 573 Report for Recall 14V-047,
Mar.
28,
2014,
http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/download/doc/UCM452913/RC
DNN-14VO47-8089.pdf.
100 See Anton R. Valukas, Report to Board of Directorsof General
Motors Company Regarding Ignition Switch Recalls, May 29, 2014,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/ 1183506/valukas-report-from-gm-redacted.pdf;
General
Motors LLC, Amended 573 Report for Recall 14V-335, June 11, 2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/download/doc/UCM458044/RC DNN-14V355-3393.pdf; General Motors
LLC, Amended 573 Report for Recall 14V-400, July 2, 2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM469452/RCLRPT-14V400-7499.PDF; General Motors
LLC, 573 Report for Recall 14V-490, Aug. 7, 2014, http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs
/download/doc/UCM459852/RCDNN-14V490-2121P.pdf.
.o. General Motors Reports for Recalls, supra note 100.
1
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525,206 Dodge and Chrysler vehicles with similarly defective ignition switches.1 0 2 ODI's investigation also
spurred a July 2014 recall of 643,618 more Chrysler vehicles.10 Finally, Chrysler initiated a recall in September
2014 of 291,703 vehicles in response to information
uncovered in its own parallel investigation. 01 4 In total,
Chrysler recalled over 1.4 million vehicles as an indirect result of the ignition switch defect.
2. Takata Airbag Recalls
On June 4, 2007, a customer filed a complaint
with Honda alleging that a safety defect caused the unusual deployment of the airbags in either their 2001
Honda Accord or Civic. 0 s The airbag inflator model apparently shot metal fragments from its outer shell
through the airbag fabric upon deployment.0 6 Two days
after that complaint was filed, an unidentified party
filed a lawsuit against Honda alleging that a similar defect existed in their 2001 Honda Accord or Civic.10 After
102 Chrysler,
573 Report for Recall 14V-373, June 25, 2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM457640/RCDNN-14V373-3445P.pdf.
103 Chrysler,
573 Report for Recall 14V-438, July 18, 2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM458610/RCDNN-14V438-4259P.pdf.
104 Chrysler,
573 Report for Recall 14V-567, Sept. 14, 2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM462724/RCDNN-14V567-8193.pdf.
'1 Honda has not disclosed whether the model of car at issue
in the complaint was an Accord or a Civic. See generallyLetter from
William R. Willen, Managing Counsel, Product Regulatory Office,
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., to George Person, Chief, Recall
Management Division, Office of Defects Investigation, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (Sept. 16, 2009) (available

at http://www.autosafety.org/sites/default/files/imce-staff-uploads/09V2 59%2OWhy%2ONot%20in%2008V593%2OResponse%20916-09.pdf).
106

Id.

107 Willen, supra note 105. While Honda has never identified the
party who filed the case, docket searches indicate that three claims
were filed against them on July 6 1h, 2007; of those claims, one was
not related to motor vehicles and another was related to a 2005
Honda Odyssey that was not subject to any Takata-related recalls.
See Rosa v. DeVilbiss Air Power Co., No. 1:07-cv-11234 (D. Mass.
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more than a year of investigating, Honda determined
that a defect existed in some of its 2001 Civic and Accord vehicles equipped with airbag inflators produced
by Takata Corporation."o' In November 2008, Honda issued its first recall related to defective Takata airbags
in its vehicles, affecting 3,940 model year 2001 Civic
and Accord vehicles.109 Eight months later, Honda issued a second recall of over 440,000 additional vehicles
equipped with Takata airbags.11 o By mid-2013, Honda
had issued recalls for more than 2.5 million vehicles
that had defective Takata airbags. 11 Finally, in 2014,
Chrysler, Ford, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota all issued recalls affecting a total of over 10.9 million vehicles
equipped with Takata airbags. Honda's competitors
July 6, 2007); Carlos Marquez v. American Honda Motor C., No.
BC373953 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 6, 2007) The third case has the entirety of its docket under seal, and was settled in 2008. Jason Mogera v. American Honda Motor Company Inc., No. KC050947(Cal.
Super. Ct. July 6, 2007).
10' Rosa, No. 1:07-cv-11234, Marquez, No. BC373953, and Mogera, No. KC050947; Honda, 573 Report for Recall 08V-593, Nov.
11
2008,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/down-

load/doc/ACM10641506/RCDNN-08V593-1511 .pdf.
109
11

2009,

Honda Recall Report, Nov. 11, 2008, supra note 108.
Honda, Amended 573 Report for Recall 09V-259, July 29,

http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/down-

load/doc/ACM12254242/RCDNN-09V259-6845.pdf
"' Honda, 573 Report for Recall 1OV-041, Feb. 9, 2010,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/downHonda, 573
load/doc/ACM13292161/RCDNN-10VO41-0123.pdf;
Report for Recall 11V-260, April 27, 2011, http://www-

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/Jiaxrs/download/doc/ACM16947967/RCDNN-11V260-6929.pdf;

Honda,

Amended 573 Report for Recall 11V-260, Dec. 1, 2011, http://www-

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/ACM1978613 1/RCDNN- 11V260-5849.pdf;
Amended 573 Report for Recall 11V-260, Dec.
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/j axrs/download/doc/UCM437303/RCDNN-11V260-4934.pdf;
Amended 573 Report for Recall 11V-260, Jan.
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/down-

14,

Honda,
2011,
Honda,

25,

2012,

load/doc/UCM360787/RCDNN-11V260-8822.pdf; Honda, 573 ReApril 10, 2013, http://wwwport for Recall 13V-132,
odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM436448/RCDNN-13V132-7704.pdf.
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said they issued the recalls because of the growing evidence that Takata-made airbags could rupture and injure vehicle occupants, which at the time were known
to be responsible for two deaths and dozens of injuries.11 2
3. Chrysler Dodge Charger Headlamp Recall
In February 2012, Chrysler issued a recall for
roughly 10,000 model year 2011-2012 Dodge Chargers
sold to police forces, which explicitly did not cover
models sold to the general public."' The recall sought
to remedy defective headlamp electrical systems that
could overheat and melt the low beam harnesses, leading to a loss of low beam operation or loss of ABS/ESC
system function.1 14 In September 2013, the low beam
headlights on Kiwanna Gathron's non-police force 2011
Dodge Charger began malfunctioning."' After repeated
attempts at self-repair of the problem, Gathron's boyfriend noticed that the car's low-beam headlight harness "appeared melted."1 ' Gathron took her vehicle to
a Chrysler dealership, where she was informed that her
car was out of warranty, and therefore the repair would
cost her $1,400 plus a service charge."' The mechanics
at the dealership told Gathron that they had "inspected
other vehicles with the same problem."" In subsequent
discussions with Chrysler, Gathron was informed that
her vehicle was not defective or subject to the earlier
recall of Dodge Chargers.11
Hiroko Tabuchi & Christopher Jensen, Now the Airbags Are
Faulty, Too, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2014, at B1.
113 David D. Dillon, Chrysler, Defect and Noncompliance Report
12V-042
(2014),
http://www112

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM416103/RCDNN-12VO42-1893.pdf; Chrysler, Owner
Notification Letter for Recall 12V-042 (2012), http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM41895 1/RCONL-12VO42-0123.pdf.
114 Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
us Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
"1 Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
"' Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
"1 Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
"9 Dillon, Chrysler, supra note 113; Chrysler, supra note 113.
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Months later, Kiwanna Gathron brought a class action lawsuit against Chrysler, alleging violations of the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act and the California Unfair Competition Law. 1 20 Gathron alleged that
Chrysler "actively concealed the headlight harness defect" in civilian cars, and "refuse[d] to recall the
Chargers sold to civilians." 121 Gathron was the owner of
a 2011 Dodge Charger that was not equipped with a "Police Group package." 1 2 2 On February 19, 2014, Chrysler
issued a motion to dismiss Gathron's case.12 3 Chrysler
claimed that Gathron had failed to establish the existence of a defect in her car, or that Chrysler knew of any
such defect when it sold the car to her. 2 4 Chrysler characterized Gathron's allegation that her Charger had the
same headlamp defect at issue in the "Police Group"
Chargers as "conclusory."125 One week after moving to
dismiss Gathron's allegations as meritless, Chrysler informed Gathron's attorney that, on the day before, it
"made the decision to recall all model-year 2011 and
2012 Dodge Charger non-police vehicles . . . to replace
the headlamp jumper harnesses and bulbs, or headlamp assemblies if needed," and that Gathron's car was
"subject to the recall."' 2 6 Chrysler and Gathron agreed
to extend relevant filling deadlines in light of the recall.1 27 In August 2014, Gathron and Chrysler agreed to
settle and dismiss the case. 1 28
In the relevant 573 report Chrysler filed with
NHTSA, the company made no mention of the Gathron
120 Complaint, Gathron v. Chrysler, No.
3:13-cv-05922 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 20, 2013).
121 Id. at
7.
122 Id. at
8.
123 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Gathron v. Chrysler, No.
3:13-cv-05922 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2014).
124 Id. at
9.
125 Id. at
3.
126 Stipulation Extending Time for Plaintiff
to Respond, Gathron
v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05922 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014).
127 Id.
128 Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal at
3, Gathron v. Chrysler
Group LLC-, No. 3:13-cv-05922 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014), 2014 WL
4828384 at *1; Joint Case Management Conference Statement,
Gathron v. Chrysler Group LLC, No. 3:13-cv-05922 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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case. 9 Chrysler claimed that the recall was initiated after the company opened an internal investigation "as a
result of increased field reports for non-Police vehicles"
in November 2013.130 The 573 report does not state
when or why the investigation closed, only that "[i]t was
later discovered the non-Police field data indicated
12

trends similar to the Police vehicle field data."13 1

4. Toyota Avalon Airbag Recall
In May 2012, Thomas Hjellming was driving his
2003 Toyota Avalon through his hometown of Wheaton,
Illinois.32 His wife, Rebecca, was sitting in the car's passenger seat.' 3 3 As they drove past a side street, a 2007

Audi Q7 driven by Monica Domzalski slammed into the
front passenger's side of the Hjellming car. 4 Rebecca
was wearing her seatbelt properly at the time of the
13

crash. 13 Nevertheless, the crash left Rebecca severely
injured and permanently disfigured.1 3 1 In July 2013, the

Hjellmings sued Toyota for negligence, loss of consortium, and strict products liability.1 3 7 They alleged that

the "untimely and unsafe" deployment of the Avalon's
front passenger airbag caused Rebecca's injuries. 13 The
court granted the Hjellmings' request to begin discovery in the case on October 3, 2013.139 Toyota was

granted its request to begin discovery on January 15,
2014.140
129

Chrysler, 573 Report for Recall 14V-101, Mar. 4, 2014,

http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM451232/RCDNN-14V101-2793P.pdf.
13o
131
132

Id. at 1-2.
Id.

Complaint at 1, Hjellming v. Toyota Motor Corporation, No.

13-L-007506 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2013).
"1 Id. at 1-3.
134

13
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4-8.
Id. at 5.

"3 Case Docket, Hiellming v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 13-L007506 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2013).
140

Id.
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Two months after the court granted Toyota's request to begin discoverV in the Hjellming case, the company issued a recall for 291,703 model year 2003-2004
Toyota Avalon vehicles. 14 1 The defect the recall sought
to remedy was a supplemental restraint system (SRS)
that had circuits susceptible to shorting. 14 2 According to
Toyota, this defect could lead to circuits being damaged
in the SRS which, in turn, could lead to either of the
front airbags "inadvertently deploy[ing]."1 4 3 Such deployment could "increase the risk of minor injury and
the possibility of a crash."14 4
In the relevant 573 report Toyota filed with
NHTSA, the company made no mention of the
Hjellmings' case. Toyota claims that the events leading
to the recall began in January 2013, when it issued a
voluntary recall of 2003-2004 Toyota Corollas that had
a defective airbag control module. 145 At the time of the
recall, Toyota "received a few field technical reports"
about inadvertent airbag deployments on Toyota Avalons with the same airbag control module present in the
recalled Corollas, and soon began an investigation into
the issue.1 4 6 Throughout 2013, Toyota received three
additional field reports relating to inadvertent airbag
deployments in 2003-2004 Toyota Avalons. 4 7 One of
these reports led to the recovery of an airbag control
module which, when analyzed by Toyota between December 2013 and late March 2014, was discovered to
have the SRS defect described above.1 48 Toyota claims
to have issued the recall immediately after this analysis
was completed.1 49

14 Toyota, 573 Report for Recall 14V-147, Mar. 27,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/down-

load/doc/UCM452859/RCDNN-14V147-2371P.pdf.
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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5. General Motors Chevrolet Malibu Body Control
Module Recall
In February 2013, high school sophomore Julius
Perkins was driving his mother's 2005 Chevrolet Malibu
on Lake Houston Parkway in Houston, Texas."so Five of
Perkins' friends, including fellow sophomore Daquan
Minor, were also in the car."' As Perkins sped along the
rain-slicked parkway, the Malibu: began to hydroplane.1 5 2 Police reports state that Perkins "lost control
of the vehicle while speeding, causing it to flip four
times" over the parkway's median.5"' Minor was wearing
his seatbelt at the time of the accident. 5 4 Still, the crash

injured him so severely that he was left "without feeling
from his midsection to his feet.""' As a result, he could
only walk short distances, and was forced to use a
wheelchair for daily activities.5 "'
Two months later, Minor brought suit against
General Motors, the manufacturer of Perkins' Malibu, on
strict liability and negligence theories.5

7

Minor alleged

a "non-exhaustive list of defects" that were present in
the Malibu, including defective restraint systems, roof
structures, and other vehicle safety systems. Minor and
General Motors entered into a joint discovery plan that
June, agreeing to complete all discovery by May 2,
2014; the court would later change this date to February

1o Complaint at 2, Branon v. General Motors LLC, No. 4:13-cv01102 (S. D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2013); Complaint at 1, Atkinson v. Perkins, No.2013-50125 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 26, 2014).
"1 Regine Murray, Minor Finds Escape in WheelchairBasketball,
in HOMER L. HALL, AARON MANFULL & MEGAN FROMM, STUDENT JOURNALISM

AND MEDIA LITERACY

40-41 (1st ed. Rosen Young Adult 2015).

Clauida Feldman, Hotwheels Wheelchair Athletes Head to
Championship Tournament, Hous. CHRON. (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Hotwheels-wheelchair-athletes-head-to-6202850.php.
152

153
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Branon, at 2, supra note 150.
Feldman, supra note 152.

Id.
Branon, at 2-3, supra note 150; Atkinson, at 1, supra note
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28, 2014.5 In August 2014, the parties agreed to a protective order that prohibited Minor from disclosing any
confidential information produced in discovery because such disclosure "could severely injure or damage
the [disclosing] party.""' Settlement hearings occurred
throughout 2014, with a final hearing being scheduled
for early May that was eventually pushed back until
June.16 0 The parties entered into a confidential settlement that month, and all documents related to discovery were sealed. 6
Three months after it completed discovery in the
Minor case, General Motors issued a recall for 2,440,524
cars including model year 2004-2012 Chevrolet Malibu
vehicles.16 2 The defect the recall sought to remedy was
a faulty Body Control Module connection system.'
That defect could cause the disablement of traction
control, electronic stability control, panic braking assist features, cruise control, and service brake lamps. 16 1

Any of these conditions "may increase the risk of a
crash.""
In the relevant 573 report General Motors filed
with NHTSA, the company made no mention of the Minor case. General Motors claims that the events leading
to the recall began in 2008, when NHTSA opened a preliminary investigation into 2005-2007 Pontiac G6 vehicles that allegedly had defective brake lamps.1 6 6 The
158 Joint Discovery/Case
Management Plan at 1-5, Branon v.
General Motors LLC, No. 4:13-cv-001102, (S.D. Tex. June, 2013); Order at 1, Branon v. General Motors LLC, No. 4:13-cv-001102, (S.D.
Tex. 2013).
"I Agreed Protective Order at 1, Branon v. General Motors LLC,
No. 4:13-cv-001102, (S.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2013)
10 Case Docket, Branon v. General Motors LLC, No. 4:13-cv001102, (last accessed Sept. 26, 2014) (PACER).
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General Motors LLC, 573 Report for Recall 14V-252,
May 14,
2014,
http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM4 55524/RCDNN-14V2 52-1248P.pdf.
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Id. at 1.
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Id.
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Id.

"' General Motors LLC, Chronology Supplement to 573 Report
Recall
14V-252,
May
14,
2014,
http://www-
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next year, General Motors initiated a voluntary recall of
those vehicles, and NHTSA closed its investigation.16 7
Four years later, in February 2013, NHTSA opened a recall query regarding complaints about defective brake
lamps in a wider range of vehicles, including 2004-2011
Chevrolet Malibu vehicles.' In November 2013, NHTSA
requested an engineering analysis from General Motors
regarding the ability of the defect to cause the disablement of traction control, electronic stability control,
panic braking assist features, cruise control, and service brake lamps.' GM conducted that analysis through
the end of January 2014.170 In March 2014, GM began
further engineering analysis regarding the alleged defect; two months after this analysis began, GM issued a
recall."'
6. General Motors Chevrolet Malibu Power Steering
System Recall
In October 2010, Andrew Moss was driving his
mother's 2005 Chevrolet Malibu Maxx on Interstate 55
just outside of Blytheville, Arkansas.1 7 2 As Moss approached a bridge, the Malibu's steering system allegedly "locked up," preventing Moss from steering the vehicle." The car struck a guardrail, crossed back over
the interstate, and slammed into a concrete barricade
before coming to a stop, leaving a trail of skid marks
the length of a football field. 17 4 MOSS suffered injuries

so serious that he had to be airlifted to a hospital in

odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM456297/RCDNN-14V252-4539.pdf.
167
168

169
170

171

Id.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.

Complaint at 2-3, Moss v. General Motors LLC, No. 3:13-cv00128 (E.D. Ark May 20, 2014); Memorandum of Law of Defendant
General Motors LLC in Support of Its Motion to Compel Discovery
at 3-4, Moss v. General Motors LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00128 (E.D. Ark.
May 21, 2014); Google Maps Search, June 1, 2015.
171 Complaint, Moss, supra
note 172.
172

174

Id.
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Memphis, Tennessee."'

Moss filed a lawsuit against General Motors in

'

May 2013 seeking damages on strict liability and failure
to warn theories."' Moss alleged that the primary cause
of his accident was a defect in the Malibu's steering system.17 7 Moss also claimed that the steering had similarly
"locked up" on a number of occasions prior to the accident, and that he had a witness to testify to this fact.1 8
General Motors issued a series of interrogatories to
Moss and his attorney, which were replied to on February 5, 2014.'7 General Motors complained to the court
that the reply was both "incomplete" and "untimely,"
citing a number of questions Moss had failed to answer.' Moss's attorney had also failed to respond to
requests by General Motors to inspect Moss's vehicle.' 8
In March 2014, seven weeks after receiving
Moss's responses to its interrogatories, General Motors
announced a recall for 1,373,177 cars including 20042006 Malibu Maxx vehicles. 8 2 The recall sought to remedy defective power steering components that could
cause "a sudden loss of power steering assists that occur at any time while driving."' 3 This would cause the
vehicle to "revert to a manual steering mode, but would
demand greater driver effort at low vehicle speeds,
which could result in an increased risk of a crash."' 8 4
In June 2014, Moss asked for his case to be dismissed without prejudice, citing "extensive discovery
requests" by General Motors that rendered him unable

17
176

'

Id.
Id.
Id.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel at 4-5, Moss,
supra note 172.
178

"7 Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 5-7.
11 Id. at 7-8.
180

Memorandum from M. Carmen Benavides, Dir. Prod. Investigations and Safety Regulations, to Nancy Lewis, Assoc. Adm'r for
Enforcement, NHTSA 14V- 153, (Mar. 31, 2014) (on file with NHTSA),
available at http://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM452932/RCDNN-14V153-7510.pdf.
182

183
184
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Id.
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to comply with discovery in a timely manner."' Moss's
filing suggested that he would re-litigate the case after
he collected more information.8 "' The court granted
Moss's motion to dismiss, and Moss does not appear to
have re-filed the case.'"'
In the relevant 573 report General Motors filed
the company made no mention of the Moss
NHTSA,
with
case. General Motors claims that the events leading to
the recall began in 2004, when NHTSA opened a preliminary evaluation of 2004 Chevrolet Malibu vehicles that
allegedly had an electric power steering defect."' After
that investigation, General Motors spent a decade
"gather[ing] and reviewing data with regard to [electric
power steering] issues," data that came from customer
complaints, and internal investigations on related vehicles, and a NHTSA investigation into the electric power
steering systems in 2004-2007 Saturn Ion vehicles."'
The company claims to have made the decision to recall
after it created a "collaboration room to review data" on
March 19, 2014.190

VI. DiSCUSSION
A. Support for the TraditionalView
The aggregate data provides some support for the
claims entailed by the traditional view. First, the data
confirm that the recalls NHTSA influenced are larger
than those it does not. However, the meaning of this
finding is unclear. NHTSA may interpret it as showing
the agency to be focused on uncovering the most widespread defects. But the data also show that the size gap
a Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice, Moss v. General Motors
LLC, No. 3:13-cv-00128 (E.D. Ark. June 12, 2014).
186

Id.

" Case Docket, Moss v. General Motors LLC, No. 3:13-cv00128-JM (E.D. Ark 2014).
's General Motors LLC, Supplemental Chronology for 573 Report for Recall 14V-153 at 3, Mar. 31, 2014, http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM455144/RCDNN-14V153-3310.pdf.
189

Id. at

190

Id.
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between NHTSA-initiated and non-NHTSA-initiated recalls disappears when recalls involving pre-recall litigation are removed from the sample. Thus, the link between recall size and NHTSA involvement may be the
result of the agency being a "Johnny-come-lately" in recalls where private litigators uncover defects.
The data also reveal a small link between NHTSA
investigations and recalls of more dangerous defects.
NHTSA-initiated recalls are, in a small but significant
way, more likely to involve recalls of defects that explicitly could cause injury. There is a similarly small
but significant negative relationship between NHTSA investigations and recalls of defects that could increase
the risk of a crash or fire. This data provides support of
the traditional view's claim that the recalls NHTSA influenced are of products with more dangerous defects
than those it does not.
B. Support for an Alternative View
While the Dataset gives limited support to the descriptive claims entailed by the traditional view, it provides no support for the traditional view's claim that
lawsuits only contribute to recalls by hanging the specter of post hoc litigation over manufacturers' heads. Instead, the data in aggregate establish that pre-recall litigation has a substantial presence in the overall recall
picture, particularly when recalls are for defects
branded as particularly dangerous. Furthermore, the recall narratives suggest that pre-recall litigation can initiate automotive recalls by uncovering defects whose
existence or extent was previously unknown to manufacturers, regulators, and the public.
This finding suggests an alternative view that
sees plaintiffs' lawyers as being able to use pre-trial discovery to investigate and uncover new information
about a defect."' In this view's view, private litigators'
powers to take depositions, hire expert witnesses, examine vehicle components, and procure documents,
11
am indebted to the work of Jon S. Vernick for providing the
outline of this view in his work on the role of litigation in preventing product related injuries. See Jon S. Vernick, How Litigation Can

Promote Product Safety, 32 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 551 (2004).
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combined with the incentive to win recovery for their
clients, make them a force for the discovery of defective automobiles. Even if an automaker already knows
about the existence of a defect, the mere filing of a claim
can help reveal information about that defect's scope
and seriousness, altering the calculus behind the decision to issue a recall.
While the Dataset strongly supports the existence
of this investigatory role for the plaintiffs' bar, it is less
certain about how often lawyers play that role. While
each of the recall narratives suggests that pre-recall litigation plays a causal role in the initiation of recalls,
the strength of those suggestions varies widely, and is
further qualified by the Dataset's methodological limitations. The figures indicating that pre-recall litigation
affected 60% of the vehicles in the Dataset speak to the
importance of the investigatory role rather than its pervasiveness. The data show that recalls that occur in the
wake of litigation are, on average, four times larger than
other recalls. The vast majority of these recalls involve
vehicles with defects that are more dangerous than
those in other recalls, and involve components that are
more likely to be critical to occupant safety.
The alternative view also asserts that the traditional view's story of how NHTSA initiates recalls is incomplete. The Dataset supports the traditional view's
assertion that recalls initiated by NHTSA tend to be
larger than those initiated by manufacturers.' 9 2 However, the correlation between pre-recall litigation and
subsequent NHTSA defect investigations shown in the
Dataset suggests that private litigation plays a role in
spurring regulatory investigations. Furthermore, litigators initiate recalls with defects that are more dangerous than those initiated by NHTSA.
The alternative view proposes a new investigatory role for private litigation in the automotive recall
process that allows litigators to initiate recalls. Further,
the view hints that the scope of that role is both large
and apt in uncovering particularly dangerous defects.

See Rupp & Taylor, Who InitiatesRecalls and Who Cares?Evidence from Automobile Industry, supra note 37.
1'
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The alternative view also sees NHTSA as initiating relatively smaller recalls that are focused on less dangerous
defects. Placed in the context of growing concern about
auto safety defects, these findings have important normative implications.
C. Normative Implications: Removing Barriersto Auto

Safety
The death toll resulting from the General Motors/
Chrysler ignition switch defect, the Takata airbag defect, and other defects indicates that more timely and
effective investigation of auto safety defects is imperative for consumer safety. The main task of investigators, be they in a police department or a law firm, is to
extract and analyze meaningful information from disparate data."' Thus, effective investigators require
three attributes: access to sources of raw data, the capacity in order to understand such data, and the incentives to drive those collection and interpretation activities toward conclusive action (i.e., arrests, lawsuits, or
recalls).
Of the players in the automotive recall game,
none possess the requisite traits to be effective investigators of auto safety defects. Manufacturers have access to relevant data on potential defects (or, at least,
have the ability to create such access), and have the
technical capacity to interpret that data in a way that
can identify defects. But, as described above, manufacturers have incentives to ignore data that could indicate

defects.194
Regulators have enormous potentialaccess to raw
data, but have squandered this ability by failing to compel manufacturers to deliver comprehensive reports on
potential defects. In June 2015, NHTSA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) released a report stating that
"ODI's processes for collecting vehicle safety data are
insufficient to ensure complete and accurate data.""
193

For more on the relationship between data and information

in criminal investigations, see W. B. SANDERS, DETECTIVE WORK: A
STUDY OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (1977).
19

See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.

'9s

NHTSA, supra note 26, at 6.
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ODI's EWR system data was found to be "ultimately of
little use due to the inconsistencies in manufacturers'
categorizations of safety incidents."'9 6 NHTSA also fails
to be an effective investigator because it does not have
the capacity to understand the data it does collect. The
same OIG report found that just one employee at ODI
reviews 90% of the roughly 330 consumer complaints
the office receives every day.' The report also found
that "ODI staff charged with interpreting statistical test
results for early warning reporting data" had "no training or background in statistics." 198
NHTSA's capacity issues stem not only from personnel problems, but from regulatory capture and
budgetary restraints. Top NHTSA officials "go on to
serve as consultants, lawyers, and expert witnesses for
the industry," while ex-industry employees are appointed to top agency posts.'9 9 Finally, NHTSA has "rather strong" budgetary incentives to avoid posing large
costs and fines on the industry. 20 0 The current director
of ODI summed up the problems with NHTSA's investigatory culture unwittingly when he said the agency
does "not like to be in a cat and mouse enforcement
posture with industry. . . [firms] that communicate with
us early and often are likely to stay out of trouble." 2 0 1
While there are proposals to transform NHTSA
into an effective investigatory body, it is doubtful that
change is on the horizon. The 2015 OIG report closed
with 17 suggestions to fix ODI's failures, ranging from
196

Id. at 7.

Id. at 15-16.
9 Id. at 17.
" See, e.g., Jeff Gelles, Defects at the Agency that Regulates Car
2015,
5,
June
INQUIRER,
PHILA.
Safety,
http://www.philly.com/philly/business/consumer-news/20150705_Defects-at-the-agencythat-regulates-car-safety.html.
200 PAUL J.
QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY
AGENCIES 132-33 (2nd ed. Princeton Univ. Press 2014).
201
Partnership for Public Service, Frank S. Borris II: Protecting
Drivers and Passengers from Vehicle Safety Defects, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-government/frank-s-borris-ii-protecting-drivers-and-passengers-from-vehicle-safety-defects/2015/03/10/f52507fe-c73611e4-aala-86135599fb0f-story.html.
197
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"[d]evelop[ing] and implement[ing] a method for assessing and improving the quality of early warning reporting data" to "[r]equir[ing] manufacturers to develop
and adhere to procedures for complying with early
warning reporting requirements."2 0 2 While NHTSA can
implement some of these suggestions by reallocating
resources, the reforms that would truly improve ODI
(i.e., vastly expanding review of complaints and manufacturer data verification) demand substantial increases to NHTSA's budget. NHTSA's own plan to remedy its defects investigation procedures hinges on a
large boost to its staff and budget. 2 03 Such an increase,
while proposed by the Obama Administration,2 0 4 is unlikely to materialize due to Congressional gridlock.2 0 5
In the face of a recalcitrant industry and an ossified regulator, private litigators may be a viable alternative in the quest for increased auto safety. The plaintiffs' bar has a large capacity to make use of data related
to potential defects, with individual lawyers having the
ability to spend years and substantial monetary resources investigating a single case. However, plaintiffs'
lawyers may not be as overly "aggressive in finding defective products" as advocates of tort reform claim.2 06
Below I outline four barriers that block litigators' access
202
203

NHTSA, supra note 26, at 26-27.
See Todd Spangler & Alisa Priddle, NHTSA Promises Changes

in Wake of GM Failures, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 5, 2015,
http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2015/06/05/nhtsasafety-team-internal-reportgm-ignition-switch/28536737/ (noting
that NHTSA is asking for "380 new employees and nearly $90 million in additional spending" to achieve its reform plan).
204 See Aaron M. Kessler, Obama's Budget Call for Increased
Funding for NHTSA Faces Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/business/obama-budgetscall-for-increased-funding-for-nhtsa-faces-uncertainty.html.
20
See Stephen Elmer, NHTSA Budget Boost Shot Down by House
http://www.au6,
2015),
(May
Panel, AUTOGUIDE.COM
toguide.com/auto-news/2015/05/nhtsa-budget-boost-shot-down-

by-house-panel.html.
206 See Barry Meier & Hilary Stout, Victims of G. M. Deadly Defect
Fall Through Legal Cracks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/business/victims-of-gmdeadly-defect-fall-through-legal-cracks.html?_r=0 (quoting an executive of the American Tort Reform Association).
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to data on potential defects and weaken their incentives
to bring litigation that could uncover defects, and I suggest ways to dismantle those barriers.
Barrier 1: Capped awards for noneconomic damages
Caps on awards for noneconomic damages may
diminish incentives for litigators to invest resources in
investigating potential auto safety defects. One prominent plaintiffs' lawyer involved in the General Motors
ignition switch cases said that these caps have made it
so that litigators "cannot afford to take an auto products case unless there is a death or serious injury." 20 7
This common complaint of the plaintiffs' bar is supported by studies that find a causal link between noneconomic damage caps and reductions in court filings."
Products liability filings are particularly prone to such
reduction because they entail the costs of intensive discovery,20' especially in states that mandate the creation
of a "reasonable alternative design" (RAD) to prove design defect.2 10
The recall narratives above also support this
claim about the negative relationship between damage
caps and defect uncovering litigation. In 2006, a Wisconsin state -trooper linked a Chevy Cobalt crash that
killed two teens to a potentially defective ignition
switch. 2 1 1 The families of the teens wanted to sue, but
Id.
See Mark J. Browne & Robert Puelz, The Effect of Legal Rules
on the Value of Economic and Non-Economic Damages and the Decision to File, 18 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 189 (1999); Mark J. Browne
& Joan T. Schmit, Litigation Patterns in Automobile Bodily Injury
207
208

OF RISK

&

Claims 1977-1997: Effects of Time and Tort Reforms, 75 J.

83 (2008).
209 See Francis H. Hare, Jr. & James L. Gilbert, Discovery in Products Liability Cases: The Plaintiffs Plea for Judicial Understanding,
12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 413 (1989); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C.
Wiggins, EmpiricalResearch on Civil Discovery, 39 B. C. L. REV. 785,
792 (1997).
210 See Frank J. Vandall, ConstructingProductsLiability:Reforms
in Theory and Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 851 (2003) (estimating the cost of reasonable alternative design construction to be
$25,000 per case).
21 Meier, supra note 206.
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could not find a plaintiffs' lawyer willing to represent
them.2 1 2 One lawyer justified his position by citing "the
$350,000 maximum recovery for loss of society in Wisconsin and the extreme expense of litigating the case
against General Motors."2 1 3 When the Meltons filed the
case that would finally uncover the ignition switch defect, they did so in Georgia, which has no caps on noneconomic damages in products liability cases.2 1 4 The
other suits profiled in the recall narratives were also
filed in states that do not cap noneconomic damages.2 1 5
Caps on noneconomic damages can also limit litigators' ability to uncover automotive defects that disproportionately harm the elderly, women, and children.
These groups may suffer "little economic loss when injured by defective products" because of their lower
wage earning potential and, in the case of the elderly,
lower future medical costs due to lower life expectancy.2 1 6 Caps on noneconomic losses serve to diminish
the potential award for injured plaintiffs suing manufacturers, reducing the incentives for litigators to represent them. For example, imagine the Volkswagen New
Beetle, whose ownership is composed of about 60%
women, 2 17 has a fatal defect in its brake system. The majority of parties injured by the defect would be women,
reducing the potential economic damages in subsequent suits against Volkswagen. In states with caps on
noneconomic damages, there would be a lower ceiling
on recovery, and a subsequently smaller likelihood of a
litigator taking a case and uncovering the defect.
212
213
214

Id.
Id.
Id.

215 See AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, Noneconomic Damages Reform,
(last visited July 15, 2015) http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconomic-damages-reform. Illinois had a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages in the mid-1990's before it was ruled unconstitutional by the state supreme court in Best v. Taylor Machine Works,
Inc., 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
216 Lucinda M. Finley,
The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:
Women, Children, and the Elderly. 53 EMORY L. J. 1263, 1281 (2004).
217 See Jonathan Welsh, What Men Want: A Volkswagen Beetle?,
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(Sept.
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2011),

http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-

seat/2011/09/19/what-men-want-a-volkswagen-beetle/.

160

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 29:1

There is a substantial literature that gives convincing reasons to remove caps on noneconomic damages. Such caps erect practical barriers to the civil justice system for the injured,2 1 8 undermine constitutional
rights to due process, 219 and reduce the incentives of
tortfeasors to internalize externalities. 2 20 This paper
adds to this literature by finding that noneconomic
damage caps decrease incentives for lawyers to play the
investigatory role outlined in the alternative view.2 2 1
Barrier 2: Lack of public access to early warning system data from manufacturers
Unlike manufacturers, litigators don't have instant access to aggregate data that could indicate potential safety defects. And unlike regulators, litigators
don't have the authority to compel the release of that
data on a regular basis. While pre-trial discovery grants
litigators access to that information sporadically, that
access is limited by the constricted focus of discovery
requests and the ability of manufacturers' counsel to
narrowly construct demands for documents.2 2 2 More importantly, discovery occurs after a litigator has decided
See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step:
Evidence on the Link between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil
Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2005).
219
See Kathryn L. Vezina, Constitutional Challenges to Caps on
Tort Damages:Is Tort Reform the DragonSlayer or Is It the Dragon,
42 ME. L. REV. 219 (1990); but see Matthew W. Light, Who's the Boss:
Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State Constitutional Law, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 315 (2001) (arguing that decisions upholding
damages caps as constitutional are better-reasoned than those that
strike them down).
220 See Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96
MINN. L. REV. 28, 3 1-34 (2011).
221 Such a change would be substantial, considering that the
states with noneconomic damages caps include: Alaska, Colorado,
Hawaii, Iowa, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, Ohio, and Oklahoma, and do not count states
that have a noneconomic damages cap limited to medical malpractice cases. See AM. TORT REFORM Ass'N, supra note 215.
222
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2237-39 (1988).
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to take a client's case. To encourage the investigative
role of private litigation in the automotive recall process, trial lawyers need expanded access to relevant
data both before and after they decide to litigate.
Such encouragement could come from small
changes in how the NHTSA collects and handles data it
receives from manufacturers' EWR systems. All defectrelated data collected by NHTSA is stored in a database
called ARTEMIS. 2 23 NHTSA makes some ARTEMIS data
public through its website, including most information
on recalls, investigations, service bulletins, and consumer complaints. 2 24 This includes disaggregate data
from EWR systems on injury/death incidents, including
the model of the vehicle, date of the accident, number
of injuries, state in which the accident occurred, and
components reportedly involved. 2 25 Left inaccessible is
the aggregate data from EWR systems relating to death
and injury reports. 2 26 This leaves litigators unable to
gain pertinent information about the nature of potential
defects (e.g., how many ignition-related accidents the
2006-2010 Chevy Cobalt was involved in). Also left inaccessible are the aggregate and case-specific data on
consumer complaints, as well as any data regarding
warranty claims or non-dealer field reports. 2 27 The lack
of access to non-dealer field reports is particularly
harmful to litigators because that data are considered
to be the "most important source of early warning data"
that provides "specific, technical" information regarding accidents, including analysis of a vehicle failure's
root cause.2 2 8
To increase litigators' access to data regarding
potential auto safety defects, NHTSA should reverse
prior rulemaking to make as much aggregate and disaggregate information received through ARTEMIS public as possible. A 2007 NHTSA rule, opposed by public
NHTSA, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: ARTEMIS (Updated 2015),
http://www.transportation.gov/individuals/privacy/pia-artemis.
224 See Recall search tool,
supra note 61.
221 See Recall search tool, supra
note 61.
223
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interest and trial lawyer groups and supported by manufacturers, barred release of most EWR system data. 229
The rule claimed that publication of the information
could cause "substantial harm to the competitive position of the manufacturer submitting the information
and is likely to impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future." 23 0 NHTSA
made the claim that consumer complaint data does not
involve safety concerns because "consumer complaint
data are not indicative of defect trends."2 3 ' This claim is
ironic because NHTSA also identifies consumer complaints as its "primary source for identifying safety concerns. "232
Barrier 3: The Restatement (Second) definition of design defect
The application of products liability law may also
be undermining the ability of litigators to play the investigatory role outlined in the alternative view. Consumers injured in car accidents usually bring claims
against manufacturers on theories of products liability.
These claims can be grouped into three major categories of theories: manufacturing defects, failures to
warn, and design defects.2 3 3 Manufacturing defects are
those that occur when a product "departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product."2 34 Failure to warn claims allege that "foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings." 3 There are two competing def-

initions of design defect. 23 6 The first is drawn from
Confidential Business Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 58434,
59437 (Oct. 19, 2007) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 512).
229

230

Id.

231

Id. at 59448.
See NHTSA supra note 26, at 2.

232
233

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§§ 1-2 (Am. Law

1998).
234 Id.

INST.

235
236

Id.

Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103
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section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which states that a product has a design defect if it is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it." 237 The competing definition is that of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, which states that a design defect
exists "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the
adoption of a reasonable alternative design ... and the
omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe." 23 8 While an explicit judicial consensus regarding a definition of design defect has not
~
ta
that claim to use the Restatebeen achieved, 239 courts
ment (Second) definition often "fail in practice to articulate and apply anything other than" Restatement
(Third) definition.2 4 0
Courts that adhere to the definition laid out in the
Second Restatement have the option of using a consumer expectations test to determine the existence of a
design defect, while courts using a Restatement (Third)
definition only use a risk-utility balancing approach.2 4 1
Supporters of the Third Restatement definition claim
that the consumer expectations test, as used by most
courts, 242 is an "intellectually bankrupt approach"
COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1702-03 (2003).

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST.

237

1965).
238

INST.

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§2 (b)

(AM. LAW

1998).

Mike McWilliams & Margaret Smith, An Overview of the Legal
Standard Regarding Product Liability Design Defect Claims and a
Fifty State Survey on the Applicable Law in Each jurisdiction, 82 DEF.
COUNS. J. 80, 83 (2015).
240 Kysar, supra note 236, at 1703 (citing James A. Henderson,
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement in the
Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 21 (2000);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1512, 1528 (1992)).
241 Id.
239

As opposed to the to-be-adopted formulation within Kysar's
"twin-test" proposal in which juries "take[e] into account the types
242

of factors that cognition psychologists and other observers of hu-

man judgment and decisionmaking have identified as pertinent to
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whose reliance on the vague concept of consumer expectations allows unprincipled jurists to impose "unrestricted liability" on helpless manufacturers.2 4 3 Supporters of the Second Restatement definition claim that a
risk-utility balancing approach will deter worthy plaintiffs from filing suit because of the "enormous costs involved in obtaining expert testimony."2 4 4 Such commentators might claim that the requirement of a RAD
undermines the investigatory role of private litigation
because "plaintiffs rarely, if ever, reach the jury in a
classic design case" without a RAD.24 5
But there is good reason to think that the use of
the Third Restatement definition of design defect actually promotes the investigatory role of private litigators
in the automotive recall process. While construction of
RADs may be expensive, they are not the kind of prohibitive barrier they are made out to be by the plaintiffs' bar. There are myriad examples of plaintiffs prevailing at trial after constructing a RAD. 2 46 RADs also
give litigators more incentive to directly investigate the
nature of the defects that harmed their clients. Using a
traditional consumer expectations test, plaintiffs can
potentially reach a jury by focusing on the public's abstract perceptions of a product's safety, rather than the

public understanding and beliefs about risk." Kysar, supra note
236 at 1704-05, 1773-74.
243 James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Consumer
ExL.
Kysar,
103
COLUM.
to
Professor
A
Response
pectations'Last Hope:
REV. 1791, 1802 (2003); See also, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski & James A.
Henderson Jr., Manufacturers'Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1067 note
34 (2009).
244 Cami Perkins,
Note, The Increasing Acceptance of the Restatement (Third) Risk Utility Analysis in Design Defect Claims, 4
NEV. L 609, 613 (2003).
245 See Twerski & Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability, supra
note 243, at 1072.
246 See Perkins, supra note 244, at 614 (citing James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product
Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 914-17 (1998)); see also Victor E.
Schwartz, The Role of the Restatement in the Tort Reform Movement: The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products Liability: A Model of
Fairnessand Balance, 10 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 44 (2000).
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specifics of an alleged defect. 24 7 With a RAD requirement, this avenue is closed; plaintiffs must expend resources to conduct a closer examination of the existing
design, usually by hiring an engineer or other expert.24 8
These efforts may lead litigators to uncover the particulars of an alleged defect, the kind of information necessary to help regulators initiate a recall.
The recall narratives support the notion that the
Restatement (Third) definition promotes auto safety,
with particular support coming from the General Motors/Chrysler ignition switch recall. There, a lawyer
filed a design defect claim in a state using the Restatement (Third) definition of design defect, hired an engineer to construct a RAD, and uncovered a specific product defect. The majority of the lawsuits profiled in the
recall narratives that alleged product liability claims
were filed in jurisdictions that require plaintiffs to construct a RAD.2 49 Only one case was not in such a jurisdiction.2 so
Barrier 4: The use of suppression orders by courts and
private parties
The recall narratives demonstrate that lawyers
may uncover defects through litigation far before the
public discovers them because of private and court-enforced suppression orders. The logic here is straightforward: "[s]uppressing information about the dangers
inherent in corporate behavior and consumer products
See Aaron D. Twerski, The Role of the Judge in Tort Law: From
Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in ProductLiability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 861,
902-04 (1983).
248 See Vandall, supra
note 210.
249 These jurisdictions include Arkansas
(see Dancy v. Hyster
Co., 127 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 1997)), Georgia (see Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 550 S.E.2d 101, 103-04 (Ga. 2001)), and Texas (see
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex.
1998)).
250 This jurisdiction was Illinois (see Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor
247

Co., 901 N.E.2d 329, 347 (Ill. 2008)). While Gathron's case was filed
in California, a Restatement (Second) jurisdiction (see Perez v. VAS
S.p.A., 188 Cal. App. 4th 658, 677-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)), Gathron
did not file a products liability claim.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

166

Vol. 29:1

deprives regulators, litigants, and consumers of
knowledge relating to safety."2 5 1 The story of the Takata
airbag recall is representative of this phenomenon.
Many victims of faulty airbags hired lawyers but rarely
filed suit against either Honda or Takata.2 5 2 Lawyers of
injured plaintiffs who settled with Honda say that news
of the recall failed to reach the public earlier because
"the few lawsuits filed were generally settled quickly,
before plaintiffs' lawyers could seek internal documents from auto companies during pretrial discovery." 25 3 As the lawyer for one victim stated, "They
wanted to resolve this immediately . .. It almost seemed
like they were going to pay us off to shut us up." 25 4 Some
scholars claim that suppression orders do not seriously
harm the public interest. 25 5 However, there is a strong

body of literature confirming that these orders pose a
significant threat to public safety, even if that threat
cannot be easily quantified.5 6
2

Daniel J. Givelber & Anthony Robbins, Public Health Versus

Court-SponsoredSecrecy, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 135 (2006).

See Jeff Green & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Air-Bag Settlements
Keep Details From Other Victims, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-17/air-bagsettlements-keep-details-from-other-victims.
Warning: This Air Bag May Contain Shrapnel,
253 Jeff Green,
252

BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-

cles/2014-10-30/driver-deaths-and-air-bag-recalls-put-takata-under-scrutiny.
254 Id.
255 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders,
and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 480 (1991);

Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery ConfidentialityControversy, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 464 (1991); Richard J. Vangelisti, Proposed
Amendment to FederalRule of Civil Procedure26(c) Concerning Protective Orders:A CriticalAnalysis of What It Means and How It Operates, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 163, 175-76 (1996).
25 Laurie K. Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.

283, 331 (1999); Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 337 (2014); Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, A Plaintiff's Lawyer's Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815 (2003); Charles J. Reed, Confidentiality and the Courts: Secrecy's Threat to Public Safety, 76
JUDICATURE 308 (1993). See also Henry J. Reske, Secrecy Orders at
Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 32, 33 (stating that court secrecy is a
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One way to prevent suppression orders from inhibiting auto safety would be to pass legislation forcing
judges to "refuse to enter [or enforce] protective orders
calling for secrecy relating to materials divulged during
pretrial discovery or settlement agreement ... in derogation of public health or safety." 25 7 This approach neuters confidentiality agreements by refusing to imbue
them with judicial enforceability. However, attempts to
pass such measures have been aborted due to lobbying
from the American Bar Association, which argues that
such laws "increase the burdens of litigation in terms
of both time and expense." 2

Even if legislative remedies are unavailable due to
interest group pressure, there are other avenues to reform. One is to amend the ethics codes that govern the
legal profession to bar lawyers from "offering or making an agreement, whether in connection with a lawsuit
or otherwise, to prevent or restrict the availability to
the public of information that the lawyer reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to the public health or safety or to the health or safety of any particular individual."2 5 9 Such an amendment would
compel both plaintiffs' and manufacturers' lawyers to
refuse to create or accept'any confidentiality agreement
that could reasonably be seen as suppressing information that "concerns a substantial danger to the public health." 26 0 A more limited reform would be to lobby

the Supreme Court to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to prevent any court record or settlement
"serious problem for the health and safety of our population");
James L. Gilbert et al., The Price of Silence, 30 TRIAL, June 1994, at
16, 17 (stating that "[d]eadly secrets lie sealed on the shelves of
courtrooms across America").
257 Givelber & Robbins, supra
note 251, at 137.
258 The ABA's claims that such laws pose an "impossible burden" on courts is dubious, considering that similar laws have been
passed in Florida and four other states. See Katherine Sullivan, Letting the Sunshine in: Ethical Implications of the Sunshine in Litigation Act, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 923, 923-24 (2010) (quoting FLA.
STAT. § 69.081 (2009)).
25
Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS
115, 116 (1999).
260 Id.
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from being sealed if it "includes information that (1) reveals liability for a prior and substantial physical or financial injury or (2) reveals a substantial risk of physical or financial injury to any person." 6 ' Even if the
Supreme Court refuses to make such an amendment,
federal district courts could be persuaded to adopt the
amendment as a local rule of procedure, as was done in
South Carolina.2 6 2 Such amendments have the benefit of
being easier to enforce than ethical guidelines, but
would fail to cover out-of-court settlements.
Opponents to approaches such as these claim
that such rules would force lawyers to put the public
interest ahead of those of their clients. 2 63 However, lawyers are already compelled to disclose confidential information in certain circumstances where the public interest collides with that of their clients or their peers.
Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which serve as a prototype for state ethics guidelines,
lawyers must disclose non-confidential data when doing otherwise would perpetuate a crime or fraud, 264 disclose or take "reasonable remedial measures" when a
client is engaging in a criminal act or fraud related to
an adjudicative proceeding,"' and inform authorities
when fellow lawyers or judges are engaging in serious
misconduct.2

6

Twelve states go further, requiring dis-

closure to prevent bodily crime, and five states mandate disclosure to prevent non-criminal fraud. 26 7

If

these rules can be enforced without destroying lawyers'
ability to practice, then there is no reason to fear that
bans on suppression orders will have similarly catastrophic outcomes.

David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned
Secrecy and the Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L. J. 807, 828
(2003).
262 Id. at 829 (citing S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(C)).
263 See Givelber & Robbins, supra note 251, at 137.
264 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1. (2010) [hereinafter
261

MODEL RULES].

MODEL RULES

r. 3.3.

266 MODEL RULES

r. 8.3.

265

See

John

S.

Dzienkowski, PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, RULES, & STATUTES 112-19 (201 3).
267
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VII. CONCLUSION

This paper demonstrates that the story of private
litigation initiating an automotive recall is not unique.
This discovery suggests a rejection of the traditional
view of the role of private litigation in the initiation of
automotive recalls and the embrace of an alternative
view that incorporates the Dataset's findings, including
that private litigation may initiate recalls that target
more vehicles as well as vehicles with more dangerous
defects. The alternative view has normative implications, including suggestions for legislatures to remove
caps on noneconomic damages, NHTSA to change its reporting regulations regarding safety data, courts to use
the Third Restatement definition of design defect, and
overseers of rules for the legal profession to restrict the
use of suppression orders.
This paper's suggestions about the details of the
alternative view demand confirmation. Such corroboration could come from a range of projects, the most
straightforward of which would be to expand the Dataset to include recalls from years beyond 2014. A more
robust Dataset would better define the scope of private
litigation's investigatory role. Another corroborating
project would be to expand the existing recall narratives to include input from the litigators and regulators
featured in them, adding to the descriptive thickness of
the alternative view. Finally, future researchers should
explore the role of private litigation in the recalls of
other products, including those managed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the Food and
Drug Administration.
The importance of these findings goes beyond
the significance of an increased understanding of the
automotive recall process. A claim that private litigation plays a substantive role in the automotive recall
process is a claim about the value of the work done by
plaintiffs' lawyers. That work is frequently character-
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ized by scholars, particularly by advocates of tort reform, as parasitic, 26 8 unethical, 269 inefficient, 2 7 0 and abusive.2 7 1 On the other hand, some scholars view the plaintiffs' bar in a more positive light, as an enforcer of
externality internalization,2 7 2 channel for civil re74
While
course, 273 and provider of corrective justice.2171
many scholars view regulation and litigation as "substitutes in the task of deterring potentially harmful conduct," 2 75 there is little academic literature that views litigation as being a substitute for regulators in terms of
uncovering broad public harms. 2 76 This paper strengthens this rarely defended view of private litigation, and
its normative suggestions assume that such a role is, in
light of a weak auto safety regulator, a necessary one.
But whether or not we should rely on private litigators
See, e.g., A. G. Harmon, Interested, but not Injured: The Compromised Status of Qui Tam Plaintiffs Under the Amended False
Claims Act and the Return of the Citizen Suit, A.B.A. (2014) (discussing the "compromised" status of "parasitic" plaintiffs in qui
tam actions).
269 See, e.g., James P. McDonald, Milberg's Monopoly: Restoring
Honesty and Competition to the Plaintiffs' Bar, 58 DUKE L. J. 507
(2008) (alleging that plaintiffs' lawyers regularly breach their fiduciary duties to clients).
270 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs' Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 349 (2006) (describing plaintiffs'
lawyers as being barriers to efficient recovery who "pocket their
contingent fees while paraprofessional employees do much of the
work").
271 See, e.g., Michael B. Barnett, The Plaintiffs' Bar Cannot Enforce the Laws: IndividualReliance Issues Prevent Consumer Protection Classes in the Eighth Circuit, 75 Mo. L. REV. 207 (2010) (noting
discussion of "rampant abuse" of the court system by plaintiffs'
lawyers who provide "negligible relief" to their clients).
272 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499 (1961).
e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Re273 See,
course in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998).
274 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of
Correctivejustice, 67 IND. L. J. 349 (1992).
279 Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J.
TORT L., 2 (2006).
276 See, e.g., THOMAS KOENIG & MICHAEL RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT
LAW (NYU Press 2003).
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to uncover threats to public safety is another question,
one that is both beyond the scope of this paper and in
need of an answer.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES
FIGURE

1. AUTOMOTIVE RECALLS, 1966-2014

m TOTAL RECALLS

0 RECALLS WITH NHTSA INFLUENCE

5000
0

4000

2000

-

3000

1000
0-

V.

l] El

It
tK
r ZN

*0't
If

SOURCE: NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN,

supra note 26.

2016

173

Private Litigation & Automotive Recalls
FIGURE

2. TOTAL VEHICLES RECALLED, 1966-2014
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FIGURE

4. TRADITIONAL VIEW OF RECALL
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